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A RUNAWAY JUDICIARY AND LEGISLATURE: WHY PENNSYLVANIA
SHOULD RECONSIDER ITS RESTRICTION ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES
AWARDS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT
KATHERINE D. TOHANCZYN*
“American government is based on the fundamental recognition that
the government and government officials can do wrong and must be
held accountable.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are married with children. Late one Sunday night, you put
your two children in the back seat of your car, buckle them in, and begin to
drive home. During that very short, and all so routine drive up I-95, you are
unable to avoid a large pothole, which causes your car to spin out of control and
flip over. As a result of the accident, you and your children suffer serious
bodily injury.2 Sometime after the accident you learn that local government
officials not only knew of the existence of the pothole but also heavily debated
the costs and benefits of fixing it. Despite having the means to fix the road, in
order to prevent accidents such as yours, the officials ultimately decided to
simply ignore the pothole and use the money elsewhere.3
Alternatively, imagine you are on your way to work and you are in a minor
traffic accident. You move your car off to the side of the road and, after seeing
that the other driver is visibly shaken up, you also move their car off to the side
of the road. A local cop arrives and begins to talk with the other driver. As
additional officers arrive on the scene, you are asked to sit in the back of a
police car. After some time, another local cop approaches the police car and
begins to yell at you. He then pulls you out of the car and strikes you multiple
times until you are unconscious. You wake up in a hospital with your wrist
handcuffed to a bed. While the hospital believes they are treating you for
*
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1. Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1202
(2001).
2. See 7 Injured when SUV Flips Over on I-95, 6ABC (May 25, 2014)
http://6abc.com/news/7-injured-when-suv-flips-over-on-i-95/77777/ [https://perma.cc/2J73UJ9L].
3. See Dallas Steele, How Much Public Money Does Your State Spend on NFL
Football?, MIC (Oct. 2, 2013) http://mic.com/articles/66077/how-much-public-money-doesyour-state-spend-on-nfl-football-check-this-chart [https://perma.cc/R5YL-NDV7] (discussing
how taxpayers provide, on average, 70% of costs for NFL stadiums). Taxpayers contributed
$229 million to building Lincoln Financial Field, the home of the Philadelphia Eagles. Jim
Panyard, $1 Billion and Counting for States’ Taxpayer-Funded Stadiums, PENNSYLVANIA
WATCHDOG (Sep. 17, 2010), https://www.watchdog.org/pennsylvania/billion-and-countingfor-state-s-taxpayer-funded-stadiums/article_d5f040af-fd5e-5272-8a5b-aac4b41f1dd4.html
[https://perma.cc/JG7H-N2FX].
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injuries sustained in the car accident, in reality you are being treated for injuries
sustained from the trooper’s unprovoked beating.4
In instances such as these, you would almost certainly bring a lawsuit
against the individuals who were directly and indirectly responsible for these
actions in order to obtain compensation.5 Along with your interest in being
compensated, the government has an interest in also deterring similar wrongful
conduct in the future.6 Generally, plaintiffs can bring a lawsuit against the
wrongdoer and those who inadvertently contribute to the wrong. For example,
a plaintiff may bring tort claims against city officials, individual officers, the
police department, and the city itself for negligent maintenance of the roads,
false arrest, negligent employment, and negligent supervision. A plaintiff may
also bring a constitutional claim for a violation of due process. Plaintiffs who
are successful in bringing such claims are generally awarded compensatory
damages, and in some cases, they may also recover punitive damages.7
Nevertheless, this basic premise of civil liability for a private injury has
been greatly curtailed by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Grounded in the
fundamental belief that the government should not be subject to costly litigation
without its consent, every jurisdiction in the United States has adopted a statute
limiting a plaintiff’s ability to sue a state, local government, or one of its
agencies.8 In the event that the governmental entity’s alleged actions are not
protected by sovereign immunity, most jurisdictions have also implemented
statutes that limit the type and amount of damages a plaintiff may recover.9
4. See Stephen J. Borek v. Ramp, No. 3974, 1992 WL 1071393, at * 170 (Pa. Com. Pl.
Phila. Cnty. May 22, 1992) (discussing how officer instructed plaintiff to sit in back of police
car and then hit plaintiff multiple times until he was unconscious).
5. See Lynn Langton & Thomas H. Cohen, Civil Bench and Jury Trials in State Courts,
2005, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS (Oct. 2008), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/
pdf/cbjtsc05.pdf [https://perma.cc/H8MG-7FK2] (compiling and interpreting statistics related
to various civil cases and subsequent damage awards in state courts). See generally Civil
Cases, U.S. COURTS http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/
HowCourtsWork/CivilCases.aspx [https://perma.cc/6EHT-LFSB] (last visited Nov. 1, 2014)
(providing basics of civil suits in U.S. federal courts).
6.
See Tort Actions and Civil Damages, WISC. BRIEF (Nov. 2001)
http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lrb/pubs/wb/01wb11.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6YFE-PYYY]
(discussing rationale for tort claims is compensation for victims and punishment and
deterrence of future wrongdoing).
7. See Damages, LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/damages
[https://perma.cc/4LUY-FF2M] (last visited Oct. 20, 2014) (providing broad definition of
compensatory and punitive damages in American civil litigation).
8. See Jack M. Sabatino, Privatization and Punitives: Should Government Contractors
Share the Sovereign’s Immunities from Exemplary Damages?, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 175, 197-98
(1997) (discussing administrative and substantive purposes of sovereign immunity including
public benefit and administration of justice).
9. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-11-21 (2014) (capping punitive damages at various
monetary limits depending on the circumstances of the civil action); ALASKA STAT. §
09.17.020 (2003) (setting evidentiary standard at “clear and convincing evidence); GA. CODE
ANN. § 51-12-5.1 (2010) (capping damages for intentional torts and products liability at
$250,000 but allowing unlimited recovery when defendant’s “specific intent to cause harm,”
or acts “under the influence of alcohol, drugs other than lawfully prescribed drugs”); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9.1 (West 2002) (requiring plaintiff to prove defendant acted
intentionally and with malice and limiting amount to same amount of compensatory damages
awarded).
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Notably, these statutes often impact the availability of punitive damages.
Punitive damages are a form of monetary relief that may be awarded to a
claimant in a civil action when the defendant’s actions are particularly
egregious.10 States vary in their allowance of punitive damages awards, ranging
from minor limitations to outright bans.11
Pennsylvania has taken an overly restrictive approach to both sovereign
immunity and punitive damages. More specifically, Pennsylvania’s statutes
allow a plaintiff to recover for a tort-based cause of action against a government
entity only when the case fits into a few specific factual scenarios. However,
for plaintiffs who can overcome this threshold issue and are able to bring a
lawsuit against the government, Pennsylvania completely bars recovery of any
punitive damages regardless of how egregious the defendant’s conduct.
This article argues that Pennsylvania’s current limitations on punitive
damages are inconsistent and illogical and urges the Commonwealth, through
legislation and judicial opinion, to allow plaintiffs—who are successful in
bringing tort actions against the government—access to such relief. Part II
explains the fundamental basis for state sovereign immunity doctrines as well as
the current structure of sovereign immunity in Pennsylvania. Part III explores
the history and development of punitive damages, which has led to
Pennsylvania’s current ban on recovery against governmental entities. Part IV
analyzes how Pennsylvania’s current statute is overly broad and inconsistent
with its own precedent and therefore, detrimental to the Commonwealth.
Finally, Part V provides Pennsylvania with a solution to its problematic
approach.
II. BEFORE ALL ELSE: BACKGROUND ON STATE SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY STATUTES
It is a generally accepted principle that governmental bodies and their
employees and agents are immune from suit, unless the state has expressly
consented to such liability.12 For tort claims, the extent of this immunity varies
10. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1977) (“Punitive damages are
damages, other than compensatory or nominal damages, awarded against a person to punish
him for his outrageous conduct”). Comment a to section 908 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts further provides: “The purposes of awarding punitive damages . . . are to punish the
person doing the wrongful act and to discourage him and others from similar conduct in the
future.” Id.
11. Compare ALA. CODE § 6-11-21 (2014) (limiting punitive damages to greater of
three times compensatory damages or $500,000), and GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1 (2010)
(capping damages for intentional torts and products liability at $250,000 but allowing
unlimited recovery when defendant’s “specific intent to cause harm,” or acts “under the
influence of alcohol, drugs other than lawfully prescribed drugs”), and MONT. CODE ANN. §
27-1-220 (West 2014) (providing that punitive damages may not exceed lesser of $10 million
or 3% of defendant’s net worth), with Burt v. Advertiser Newspaper Co., 28 N.E. 1, 5 (Mass.
1891) (“Vindictive or punitive damages are never allowed in this state.”), and Abel v.
Conover, 104 N.W.2d 684, 690 (Neb. 1960) (refusing to adopt punitive damages).
12. See, e.g., Palmetto Fire Ins. Co. v. Beha, 13 F.2d 500, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1925); Mills
v. Stewart, 247 P. 332, 334-35 (Mont. 1926) (“It is elementary that a state cannot be sued
without its consent . . . .”); Calkins Dredging Co. v. State, 131 S.E. 665, 668 (N.C. 1926)
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by jurisdiction, as can be seen in the stark contrast between Virginia and
Pennsylvania.13 A citizen of any state may seek damages from a local or state
government for a violation of due process regardless of that state’s specific
sovereign immunity statute.14
A. Sovereign Immunity as Applied in Tort Cases
Forty state constitutions provide citizens with an explicit or implied right to
access the courts in order to seek a remedy against a defendant for an injury to
their person, reputation, possessions, or property.15 However, the availability of
that right is generally limited in some manner if the plaintiff is seeking to bring
a claim against a government agency or employee. Each state has enacted a
statute that provides the government some form of immunity from liability for
tort claims. For example, in Virginia, the government may be sued for a variety
of claims including those arising out of intentional torts, which opens the door
to a potential recovery of punitive damages.16 Conversely, Pennsylvania takes a
far more stringent view, allowing for suits if two factors are met: (1) the
governmental action was the result of negligence, and (2) the governmental
action fits into one of the specific factual situations specifically enumerated in
the statute.17 As such, Pennsylvania’s sovereign immunity statute generally
renders recovery of any kind against the government almost impossible.
1.

Virginia’s Commonsense Approach: Allowing Suits for Intentional or
Reckless Disregard

While “the doctrine of sovereign immunity is ‘alive and well’ in Virginia,”
the state has provided injured plaintiffs with a variety of opportunities for
judicial recovery.18 Under the Virginia Tort Claims Act, the Commonwealth
(explaining state can only be sued when state has consented or if Supreme Court of United
States has original jurisdiction). The doctrine of sovereign immunity is based on the archaic
premise that “the King can do no wrong” and was therefore immune from all claims. See
generally George W. Pugh, Historical Approach to the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity, 13
LA. L. REV. 476 (1953) (outlining history of sovereign immunity in England and its
imputation into America).
13. For a comparison of Virginia and Pennsylvania’s tort claims statutes, see infra
notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see infra notes 24-26
and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 13 (1901); ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 11; DEL. CONST.
art. I, § 9 (amended 1999); IDAHO CONST. art. 1, § 18; LA. CONST. art. I, § 22; ME. CONST .
art. I, § 19; MD. CONST. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. 19; MISS. CONST. art. III, § 24; N.H.
CONST. pt. I, art. 14; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 18; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 16; PA. CONST. art. I, §
11; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 5; TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 13; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 11; WYO. CONST.
art. I, § 8. The ten state constitutions that do not provide for this important right are Alabama,
California, Hawaii, Illinois, Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, and New York.
16. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.3 (2007).
17. 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8522 (West 1986)
18. Messina v. Burden, 321 S.E.2d 657, 660 (Va. 1984) (“Though this Court has, over
the years, discussed the doctrine in a variety of contexts and refined it for application to
constantly shifting facts and circumstances, we have never seen fit to abolish it. Nor does the
General Assembly want the doctrine abolished.”).
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government is liable for the acts or omissions of its employees or agents that
amount to gross negligence and intentional torts.19 Another statute similarly
prohibits local governmental bodies from claiming protection under sovereign
immunity when the actions of their agents and employees constitute “intentional
or willful misconduct or gross negligence.”20 Put differently, both the state and
local governments of Virginia could be liable to an injured plaintiff when its
agents or employees’ actions are shockingly bad. Thus, unlike their
Pennsylvania counterparts, plaintiffs in Virginia have an opportunity to have the
merits of their case evaluated rather than dismissed simply because the
defendant is an arm of the government.
2.

Pennsylvania’s Backwards Approach: Limiting Suits to Negligence Claims

In keeping with the archaic belief that the state should not be encumbered
by civil lawsuits, Pennsylvania’s legislature has adopted two statutes that
strictly limit an injured plaintiff’s ability to sue and recover damages against the
government: (i) the Sovereign Immunity Act and (ii) the Political Subdivision
Tort Claims Act. Under the Sovereign Immunity Act, a Commonwealth entity
or employee may only be sued for ordinary negligence.21 Moreover, under this
statute, in order to bring a claim against the Commonwealth, this negligence
must arise out of one of nine explicitly provided instances within the statute.22
Similarly, the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act preserves the immunity of
local governmental agencies, except in instances of ordinary negligence arising
out of one of eight specific situations listed in the statute.23 The Commonwealth
and local governments remain completely immune from liability for any injury
19. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.3 (“[T]he Commonwealth shall be liable for claims for
money . . . on account of damage to or loss of property or personal injury or death caused by
the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee while acting within the scope of
his employment . . . .”).
20. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1405 (West 1997) (waiving sovereign immunity of local
government and it political subdivision for intentional torts and gross negligence). Whether
an employee may claim qualified immunity when sued individually for conduct that occurred
within the scope of his or her employment, is to be determined applying a four part factors
test. See Messina, 321 S.E.2d at 663 (citing James v. Jane, 282 S.E.2d 864, 869 (Va. 1980))
(“(1) the nature of the function performed by the state employee; (2) the extent of the state’s
interest and involvement in the function; (3) the degree of control and direction exercised by
the state over the employee; and (4) whether the act complained of involved the use of
judgment and discretion.”).
21. See 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8522 (West 1986) (preserving
sovereign immunity except for “for damages arising out of a negligent act”).
22. See id. (listing nine scenarios in which state may be sued for negligence as (1)
vehicle liability; (2) medical-professional liability; (3) care, custody or control of personal
property; (4) Commonwealth real estate, highways and sidewalks; (5) potholes and other
dangerous conditions; (6) care, custody or control of animals; (7) liquor store sales; (8)
National Guard activities; and (9) toxoids and vaccines).
23. Id. § 8542 (providing that local government may only be sued for “negligent acts of
the local agency or an employee thereof acting within the scope of his office or duties with
respect to” (1) vehicle liability; (2) care, custody or control of personal property; (3) care,
custody or control of real property; (4) dangerous condition of trees, traffic controls or street
lighting; (5) dangerous condition of utility service facilities; (6) dangerous condition of
streets; (7) dangerous condition of sidewalks and (8) care, custody or control of animals).
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in which an agent or employee’s actions are intentional or done with a
substantial disregard for potential injury. Thus, so long as Pennsylvania
officials take a passive approach to their jobs, they are essentially immune from
suit.
B. Sovereign Immunity as Applied to Section 1983 Claims
In contrast to state tort statutes, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff can sue
the government for violation of due process or other civil rights without
applicability of sovereign immunity.24 While states are generally entitled to
Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal court, local governments are not
immune from damages resulting from their violation of a citizen’s constitutional
rights.25 In addition, state sovereign immunity statutes do not shield local
governments from liability for violations of section 1983.26 Therefore, plaintiffs
whose civil rights have been violated have a much easier time initially bringing
a claim against a governmental entity or official.
However, like tort-based claims, under section 1983 claims, a plaintiff is
not able to recover punitive damages. As a general matter, a violation of
section 1983 is likely to involve egregious conduct. Because these claims are
brought against a governmental agency or employee, courts have held that
recovery of punitive damages is not permitted. As such, the courts again have
limited recovery of damages in order to protect the government despite bad
behavior by the government’s representatives.
III. BUILDING UP: BACKGROUND ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Punitive damages have been awarded for centuries and have been the
subject of both support and criticism throughout this period. For example, early
American courts wholeheartedly embraced this form of recovery as a valid
means to punish and deter reprehensible conduct. However, as the country
began to move toward tort reform, punitive damages began to be curtailed in
order to protect a defendant’s rights. While the current status of punitive
damage awards ranges across a continuum, Pennsylvania has taken a hardline
approach when it comes to suits against the government. More specifically,
Pennsylvania is currently at an extreme end of the continuum completely
banning recovery.

24. 42 U.S.C § 1983 (1996).
25. Compare Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974) (“Thus the rule has evolved
that a suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public
funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”), with Owen v. City of
Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 657 (1980) (“[H]olding that municipalities have no immunity
from damages liability flowing from their constitutional violations . . . .”).
26. See Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 377-78 (1990) (explaining that section 1983
preempts state sovereign immunity); see also United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 158–59
(2006) (noting that Congress intended to abrogate state sovereign immunity when state
violates citizen’s constitutional rights).
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A. A History of Punitive Damages

Punitive damages have ancient origins in the legal system, and were even
noted in the Babylonian Hammurabi Code, the Hindu Code of Manu, and the
Bible.27 In relatively more modern times, these damages were eventually
adopted by the English courts in two companion cases in 1763 as a way to deter
and punish the misuse of power and wealth by aristocracy.28 Like many other
English-approved legal doctrines, punitive damages were subsequently adopted
by the American legal system.29
The early American courts used punitive damages as a means to punish
those who willfully abused physically weaker individuals.30 With this lofty goal
underlying courts’ decisions, punitive damages were considered a staple of
American tort law and almost every state allowed for some form of recovery of
punitive damages against private individuals.31 Recovery of punitive damages
was subsequently expanded to allow recovery against corporations in order to
punish companies who placed profits above the safety of workers and
consumers.32
Despite this initially warm embrace of punitive damages, by the end of the
nineteenth century, divergent views regarding punitive damages began to
emerge. Signs of strong opposition to this form of recovery emerged slowly
and were ultimately embraced in the 1980s, as part of nationwide tort reform.
As a result, perceived unchecked tort litigation and exuberant damages awards,
in particular punitive damages awards, many states implemented statutory
limitations on the recovery of punitive damages.33 While, these statutory
restrictions were quickly met with various constitutional challenges, most
remain valid today.34
27. See Michael Rustand & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive
Damages Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U.L. REV. 1269, 1285 (1993)
(noting existence of punitive damages in early legal codes and quoting specific passages from
Bible).
28. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 27, at 1287-88 (citing Wilkes v. Wood and Huckie
v. Money as first instance of express adoption of punitive damages in England). In Wilkes v.
Wood the publisher of a controversial newspaper sued a member of Parliament for trespass
after the publisher was arrested for criticizing his speech. Id. at 1287 n.95. In Huckle v.
Money, a journeyman sued agents of the King for false imprisonment and trespass. Id. at
1288-89.
29. See Genay v. Norris, 1 S.C.L. 6, 7 (U.S. 1784) (“[V]ery serious injury to the
plaintiff . . . entitled him to very exemplary damages, especially from a professional
character . . . .”). In Genay the defendant spiked plaintiff’s wine glass as the two prepared to
duel, causing the plaintiff “extreme and excruciating pain.” Id. at 6.
30. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 27, at 1292-93 (discussing early cases and the
underlying factual premises that contributed to plaintiff’s recovery of punitive damages).
31. David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions, Problems and Reform,
39 VILL. L. REV. 363, 369-70 (1994) (discussing how every state but Nebraska provided for
punitive damages through either common law or statute).
32. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 27, at 1295.
33. See generally Tort Reform Record, AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N (December 2014)
http://www.atra.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Record-12-18-14.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ADJ6-ADAS].
34. See, e.g., Henderson v. Ala. Power Co., 627 So.2d 878, 884 (Ala. 1993) (discussing
plaintiff’s claim that statute limiting punitive damages violates right to trial by jury); Mack
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Running parallel to this legislative action, the Supreme Court
independently sought to reduce the punitive damages awards assessed against
defendants. This outcome was accomplished when the Supreme Court held that
punitive damages awarded without adequate procedural safeguards could
violate the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.35 While the
Supreme Court found certain state limitations on punitive damages to be
unconstitutional, the presumption is that such limitations on damages are valid
as an economic regulation, unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that they are
arbitrary or irrational.36
Today, almost every jurisdiction recognizes the common law doctrine of
punitive damages.37 In addition, the most prevalent justifications for punitive
damages continue to be to punish and to deter the defendant and others from
engaging in such wrongful behavior in the future.38 As such, punitive damages
are recoverable generally only where the plaintiff is harmed as the result of
particularly egregious and intentional misconduct.39
Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle, 436 S.E.2d 635, 639 (Ga. 1993) (upholding lower court decision that
punitive damages cap does not violate equal protection under state constitution).
35. See Pac. Mutual Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1991) (“As long as the
discretion is exercised within reasonable constraints, due process is satisfied.”).
36. Compare BMW of N.A. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572-75 (1996) (holding that while
state may impose punitive damages to further its interest in deterring unlawful conduct,
grossly excessive damages violated Due Process Clause), and Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512
U.S. 415, 430-35 (1994) (finding that Oregon’s common law violated Due Process), with
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 83-84 (1978) (holding that
Court must “defer to the congressional judgment unless it is demonstrably arbitrary or
irrational.”).
37. See Doug Rendleman, Common Law Punitive Damages: Something for Everyone?,
7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1, 1 (“All but five [out of fifty states and the District of Columbia] have
common law or court-made punitive damages, developed and maintained by the state’s
judiciary with legislative oversight and within federal and state constitutional limits.”).
38. See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008) (“Regardless of the
alternative rationales over the years, the consensus today is that punitives are aimed not at
compensation but principally at retribution and deterring harmful conduct.”); Linthicum v.
Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 723 P.2d 675, 679 (Ariz. 1986) (“Exemplary or punitive damages
are those damages awarded in excess of full compensation to the victim in order to punish the
wrongdoer and to deter others from emulating his conduct.”); Guthridge v. Pen-Mod, Inc., 239
A.2d 709, 715 (Del. Super. 1967) (noting that punitive damages are intended to punish
wrongdoer and prevent others from engaging in similar behavior); Winn & Lovett Grocery
Co. v. Archer, 171 So. 214, 221 (Fla. 1936) (discussing how punitive damages serve as
deterrent); Foss v. Maine Tpk. Auth., 309 A.2d 339, 345 (Me. 1973) (reasoning that
deterrence is adequate rationale but that punishment is not a goal); Leimgruber v. Claridge
Assocs., Ltd., 375 A.2d 652, 654 (N.J. 1977) (stating that punitive damages “are awarded
upon a theory of punishment to the offender for aggravated misconduct and to deter such
conduct in the future”); Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 383 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tenn.
1964) (holding punitive damages serve strong public policy of punishment and deterrence).
39. See, e.g., Bridges v. Alaska Hous. Auth., 375 P.2d 696, 702 (Ala. 1962) (“Punitive
or exemplary damages are those awarded in excess of actual loss where the wrongdoer’s
conduct can be characterized as outrageous, such as acts done with malice or bad motives or a
reckless indifference to the interests of another.”); Guthridge v. Pen-Mod, Inc., 239 A.2d 709,
715 (Del. Super. 1967) (“Punitive damages may be awarded only if the jury finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendants’ actions were motivated by some form of
malice; that is, by ill-will, hatred, spite, or a conscious desire to do injury and hurt the
plaintiffs.”); Winn & Lovett Grocery Co. v. Archer, 171 So. 214, 221 (Fla. 1936) (stating that
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B. Pennsylvania’s Hardline Restriction on Punitive Damages

Under Pennsylvania law, punitive damages are recoverable in connection
with a number of civil causes of action.40 Pennsylvania has adopted section 908
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which governs punitive damages.41 Under
the Restatement approach, the goal of punitive damages is to punish and deter a
tortfeasor from engaging in similar conduct in the future.42 Because it is
impossible to deter a person from malicious conduct if he is not conscious of
the risks associated with his conduct, “[t]he state of mind of the actor is vital.”43
Specifically, in Pennsylvania, a plaintiff must present enough evidence to
demonstrate that “(1) a defendant had a subjective appreciation of the risk of
harm to which the plaintiff was exposed and that (2) he acted, or failed to act, as
the case may be, in conscious disregard of that risk.”44 Ultimately, in awarding
damages, a jury must look at the defendant’s actions “together with all the
circumstances including the motive of the wrongdoer and the relations between
the parties . . . .”45

punitive damages are only awarded “where torts are committed with fraud, actual malice, or
deliberate violence or oppression, or when the defendant acts willfully, or with such gross
negligence as to indicate a wanton disregard of the rights of others”); Huebsch v. Larson, 191
N.W.2d 433, 435 (Minn. 1971) (noting that plaintiff may only recover punitive damages when
defendant’s actions are “malicious, wilful or in reckless disregard of the rights of others”);
Chambers v. Montgomery, 192 A.2d 355, 358 (Pa. 1963) (holding that punitive damages may
only be assess when defendant actions are malicious, wanton, reckless, willful, or oppressive);
Berberian v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 369 A.2d 1109, 1112 (R.I. 1977) (explaining that
defendant must have acted with malice, wantonness or willfulness in order for plaintiff to
recover).
40. See, e.g., Rizzo v. Haines, 555 A.2d 58, 69 (Pa. 1989) (upholding punitive damage
award for attorney malpractice); Scampone v. Grane Healthcare Co., 11 A.3d 967, 992 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2010) (citing 40 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1303.505 (2002), which allows recovery of
punitive damages for medical malpractice); Hutchinson v. Penske Truck Leasing Co., 876
A.2d 978, 983 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (noting plaintiff may recover punitive damages for strict
products liability); Am. Future Sys., Inc. v. BBB, 872 A.2d 1202, 1211 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005)
(discussing requirements for private plaintiff to recover punitive damages for defamation);
McDaniel v. Merck, Sharp & Dohme, 533 A.2d 436, 448 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (finding
punitive damages could be recovered against drug manufacturer for deliberately and
negligently failing to communicate knowledge of serious risk of illness and death resulting
from drug to medical community); Frisk v. News Co., 523 A.2d 347, 353 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1986) (upholding recovery of public figure for defamation); Delahanty v. First Pennsylvania
Bank, N.A., 464 A.2d 1243, 1265 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (finding that jury may award punitive
damages for fraud).
41. See Kirkbride v. Lisbon Contractors, Inc., 555 A.2d 800, 802 (Pa. 1989) (adopting
section 908 of Restatement (Second) of Torts).
42. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 (1965) (“Punitive damages may be
awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the defendant’s evil motive or his reckless
indifference to the rights of others.”); see also id. § 500 cmt. a (“Recklessness may consist of
either of two different types of conduct. In one the actor knows, or has reason to know . . . of
facts which create a high degree of risk of . . . harm to another, and deliberately proceeds to
act, or to fail to act, in conscious disregard of, or indifference to, that risk. In the other the
actor has such knowledge, or reason to know, of the facts, but does not realize or appreciate
the high degree of risk involved, although a reasonable man in his position would do so.”).
43. See Feld v. Merriam, 485 A.2d 742, 748 (Pa. 1984).
44. See Hutchison ex rel. Hutchison v. Luddy, 870 A.2d 766, 772 (Pa. 2005).
45. See Chambers v. Montgomery, 192 A.2d 355, 358 (Pa. 1963).
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Despite a continued acceptance of punitive damages in claims against
private individuals and corporations, Pennsylvania has taken the extreme
position that punitive damages may never be recovered against a governmental
entity in a tort action. Under section 8528 of the Pennsylvania code, a plaintiff
bringing suit against the Commonwealth or a local government may only
recover one of five specifically listed damages:
(1) Past and future loss of earnings and earning capacity. (2) Pain and
suffering. (3) Medical and dental expenses including the reasonable value of
reasonable and necessary medical and dental services, prosthetic devices and
necessary ambulance, hospital, professional nursing, and physical therapy
expenses accrued and anticipated in the diagnosis, care and recovery of the
claimant. (4) Loss of consortium. (5) Property losses, except that property
losses shall not be recoverable in claims brought pursuant to section
8522(b)(5) (relating to potholes and other dangerous conditions).”46
While this statute does not specifically bar recovery of punitive damages,
courts have interpreted the absence of punitive damages from that statute to
mean that such damages should not be assessed against any Commonwealth or
local governmental bodies for tort-based actions.47 This interpretation of the
meaning of the absence of punitive damages, as an explicit remedy, is
reasonable given that the legislature did explicitly provide for the recovery of
punitive damages in certain instances of criminal conduct, meaning the absence
of punitive damages was likely intentional.48
IV. ANALYSIS
Pennsylvania’s current statutes create an inequitable approach to punitive
damage awards against the government that is overly harsh and has resulted in
negative effects that cause more harm than good.
Specifically, the
Commonwealth’s ban on punitive damage awards is based on false perceptions
of the frequency and extent of such awards, and therefore, has resulted in an
overly strict policy. As such, this approach impacts a government official’s cost
benefit analysis of how to handle egregious conduct, thus limiting punitive
damages most valuable purpose. This approach also impermissibly grants the
government an exception from having to pay for its tortious conduct simply
because of its governing role, which directly contradicts the basic notion that no
man—including the government—is above the law. Finally, the legislature’s
decision to permit a plaintiff to recover damages and to allow an employee to
seek indemnification when the employee’s actions amount to negligent
behavior, but prohibit recovery and indemnification for intentional misconduct,
46. 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8528 (West 1980) (listing damages
recoverable against government).
47. See Feingold v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 517 A.2d 1270, 1277 (Pa. 1986) (finding
punitive damages could not be awarded against SEPTA because it was Commonwealth
agency protected by sovereign immunity from such damages).
48. See 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9183 (West 1980) (imposing counsel
fees, actual damages, and punitive damages in instances where government official’s conduct
is willful).
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is illogical and must be reconsidered.
A. Pennsylvania’s Limitations on Punitive Damages Are Overly Restrictive
Given the Current Statistics and Procedural Safeguards
As discussed below, because excessive punitive damages awards are rare,
and both the amount and frequency of punitive damage awards are already
significantly limited, it is unnecessary for states to completely bar recovery of
punitive damages against the government. “Since 1979 there has been a
systematic tort reform backlash against punitive damages in all but a few
states.”49 This “backlash” and subsequent limitations on punitive damages are
primarily based upon the media’s sensationalization of the idea that lawsuits
consistently result in run-away juries. Part of this media hype also includes the
notion that exuberant verdicts could cause companies and investors to shy away
from engaging in business within the state or face bankruptcy.50 Due to this
unfavorable media exposure, Pennsylvania initially enacted various limitations
on punitive damages awards to protect American corporations.51
Nevertheless, Pennsylvania’s legislature subsequently decided to take even
more stringent steps in order to protect itself. Specifically, in an effort to
protect the Commonwealth and local governments from having to foot a
supposedly unwarranted verdict, the legislature enacted the most restrictive
limitation possible: a complete ban on punitive damage awards against the
government.52 Pennsylvania courts also added an additional layer of protection
by labeling punitive damages awards against the government as contrary to
public policy.53 As a result, Pennsylvania began to severely limit a plaintiff’s
recovery for punitive damages against the government.54 Ultimately, this
49. Michael L. Rustad, The Closing of Punitive Damages’ Iron Cage, 38 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1297, 1311 (2005).
50. See id. at 1297 (quoting Richard L. Blatt, ADR Can Help Fend Off Big Punitive
Awards: Tools Such As Mediation Enable Cost-Effective Resolution Of Claims, 2001 WL
5,101,243, Apr. 23, 2001, at *10) (“Punitive damages can wreak all kinds of havoc, from
damaging corporate financial performance in the short run, to threatening a company’s very
existence.”). Despite the perception that punitive damages are awarded by out-of-control
juries, a study of judge and jury trial outcomes in forty-five U.S. states uncovered “a higher
rate of punitive damages awards in judge trials than in jury trials.” See Theodore Eisenberg et
al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An Empirical Study, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 743,
750 (2002).
51. See Rustad, supra note 49, at 1301 (“The story of punitive damages recoil is a
familiar one about special legislation to help corporate America.”).
52. See 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8528 (West 1980) (listing damages that
are recoverable against state and local governments in Pennsylvania, in which punitive
damages is not included); see also Hoy v. Angelone, 720 A.2d 745 (Pa. 1998) (noting that
punitive damages are not recoverable under the Human Relations Act, which allows suit for
discrimination by private and public individuals).
53. See Feingold v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 517 A.2d 1270, 1276 (Pa. 1986) (quoting
Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 263 (1981)) (“In general, courts viewed
punitive damages as contrary to sound public policy, because such awards would burden the
very taxpayers and citizens for whose benefit the wrongdoer was being chastised.”).
54. Compare Mathies v. Mazet, 30 A. 434 (Pa. 1894) (allowing recovery of punitive
damages against spouse for alienation of affection), with Chambers v. Montgomery, 192 A.2d
355 (1963) (striking down punitive damages award against defendant who punched plaintiff in
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movement—from unlimited recovery to no recovery—was unjustifiably
extreme because punitive damages are seldom awarded, and when they are
awarded, such recovery is reasonable. To the extent that an award is
unreasonable, the Pennsylvania trial judges have discretion to scale back the
verdict.55
The common perception is that punitive damage awards are frequently and
grossly excessive.56 However, there is little to no empirical evidence supporting
this belief. Conversely, numerous studies demonstrate a far more rational
pattern to awards for punitive damages. For example, as an initial matter,
“[u]nless the case involves an intentional tort or a business-related tort (such as
employment claims), punitive damages will almost never be awarded.”57 And
even when they are awarded to an injured plaintiff, punitive damage awards are
rarely the excessive verdicts portrayed in the news.58 Furthermore, verdicts for
punitive damages tend to be highly correlated to both the plaintiff’s injury and

back of head and continued to punch plaintiff while he was on ground, resulting in serious
personal injury).
55. See Kirkbride v. Lisbon Contractors, Inc., 555 A.2d 800, 803-04 (Pa. 1989) (“[A]t
some point the amount of punitive damages may be so disproportionate when compared to the
character of the act, the nature and extent of the harm and the wealth of the defendant, that it
will shock the court’s sense of justice. In those rare instances, the court is given discretion to
remit the damages to a more reasonable amount.”). An empirical study found that, in general,
judges frequently reverse or remit punitive damages awards in the post-verdict stage. See
Michael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages of Products Liability: Testing Tort
Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78 IOWA L. REV. 1, 51 (1992).
56. See, e.g., Thomas B. Hudson, Punitive Damages: How Much Is Too Much?, AUTO
DEALER MONTHLY (Nov. 2007), http://www.autodealermonthly.com/channel/dpsoffice/article/story/2007/11/punitive-damages-how-much-is-too-much.aspx
[https://perma.cc/Z9A4-HYW9] (“The court’s award of punitive damages—less than twice
the actual damages award—should help keep Texas jury awards under control.”); Jennifer
Kay, U.S. Tobacco Company Hit With $23.6B In Punitive Damages After Widow’s Lawsuit,
CTV NEWS (July 19, 2014), http://www.ctvnews.ca/health/u-s-tobacco-company-hit-with-236b-in-punitive-damages-after-widow-s-lawsuit-1.1922027#ixzz3I8ZbOtGY
[https://perma.cc/7D3U-YDNG] (discussing various “large jury verdicts awarding tens of
millions of dollars” in punitive damages against tobacco companies); Michael Wilt, California
Court: Excessive Punitive Damages Are Fine If You’re Wealthy Enough, FORBES (Aug. 19,
2011, 1:32 PM) http://www.forbes.com/sites/wlf/2011/08/19/california-court-excessivepunitive-damages-are-fine-if-youre-wealthy-enough/ [https://perma.cc/B7ZD-DDA3] (“If
there are no limits to what punitive damages can be levied against a defendant merely because
they can afford to pay them, juries would be empowered to bankrupt corporations even though
the relative harm to the plaintiff in compensatory damages does not demand such a result.”).
57. Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J. LEGAL
STUD. 623 (1997).
58. See CAROL DEFRANCES ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, CIVIL JURY CASES AND
VERDICTS
IN
LARGE
COUNTIES
(1995),
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/4be2/
42ed0c1732f47b6537fbfbc3a4d0f63457f5.pdf [https://perma.cc/KB29-NJGH] (“Punitive
Damages were awarded in 6% of the jury case with a plaintiff winner.”); see also Michael
Rustad & Thomas Koenig, Reconceptualizing Punitive Damages in Medical Malpractice:
Targeting Amoral Corporations, Not “Moral Monsters”, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 975, 1009
(1995) (“The typical (median) punitive damage award [in a medical malpractice claim] was
quite modest, $228,600.”); Rustad, supra note 55, 45-50 (finding that out-of-control juries are
part of media hype and in reality punitive damage awards in products liability cases are “quite
modest” and were roughly “proportional to actual damages”).
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the egregiousness of the defendant’s actions.59
If allowed against the Commonwealth or local governments, it is unlikely
that punitive damage awards would become as unreasonable or excessive as the
news stories portray due to the extensive procedural safeguards put into place
by the Pennsylvania legislature and judiciary. As discussed above, punitive
damage awards have a heightened standard and may only be recovered when
the plaintiff can demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct was malicious or
willful.60 This mens rea-like requirement is also extended to strict liability
actions, meaning that a defendant may present evidence, which would
ordinarily be inadmissible, that his conduct was reasonable and therefore,
punitive damages are inappropriate.61 Moreover, in order to recover punitive
damages in a defamation case, and arguably in other tort cases, a plaintiff must
provide clear and convincing evidence to support his or her claim, which is
more than the general burden of by a preponderance of the evidence.62
In addition to heightened burden of proof, Pennsylvania courts also seek to
minimize the potential prejudice of the jury in various ways. For example,
courts generally require the jury to consider and render separate verdicts for
compensatory and punitive damages.63 Pennsylvania has also developed a
special rule of civil procedure governing discovery and admissibility of a
defendant’s wealth as evidence so as to prevent prejudice the jury.64 Finally, the
courts may also choose to bifurcate verdicts based on compensatory and
punitive damages.65
59. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 58, 1027-29 (finding that in medical malpractice
claims resulting in punitive damages, 33% of plaintiffs were killed, 25% of plaintiffs suffered
permanent disability, 24% involved severe emotional trauma, and 50% involved sexual abuse
or assaults).
60. See Rizzo v. Haines, 555 A.2d 58, 69 (Pa. 1989) (“The act or omission must be
intentional, reckless, or malicious.”); Chambers v. Montgomery, 192 A.2d 355, 358 (Pa.
1963) (“exemplary damages must be based on ‘“malicious,” “wanton,” “reckless,” “willful,”
or “oppressive” conduct on the part of defendant’”) (internal citations omitted). For further
discussion of Pennsylvania’s state of mind requirement, see supra notes 43-45 and
accompanying text.
61. Nigro v. Remington Arms Co., 637 A.2d 983, 989-90 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)
abrogated on different grounds by Aldridge v. Edmunds, 750 A.2d 292 (Pa. 2000)
(“Compliance with industry standard and custom tends to support the defense that Remington
acted with a nonculpable state of mind, and would negate an inference of wanton indifference
to the rights of others. Accordingly, such evidence is material and admissible to refute Nigro’s
claim for punitive damages.”).
62. See Bargerstock v. Wash. Greene Cmty. Action Corp., 580 A.2d 361, 366 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1990) (explaining clear and convincing standard, which is higher than ordinary
preponderance of evidence, is required in defamation clams); see also Temporaries, Inc. v.
Krane, 472 A.2d 668, 674 n.2 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (“Had we heard the case in the first
instance we might not have imposed punitive damages, which must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence.”).
63. See Givens v. W.J. Gilmore Drug Co., 10 A.2d 12, 16 (Pa. 1940) (ordering lower
court to instruct jury to indicate amount of compensatory and punitive damages separately).
64. PA. R. CIV. P. 4003.7 (“A party may obtain information concerning the wealth of a
defendant in a claim for punitive damages only upon order of court setting forth appropriate
restrictions as to the time of the discovery, the scope of the discovery, and the dissemination
of the material discovered.”).
65. See Mitchell v. Randal, 137 A. 171, 172-73 (Pa. 1927) (“[W]hen punitive as well
as compensatory damages are involved in a case like the one now before us, it is entirely
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Despite the common assumption that multi-million dollar verdicts are
awarded regularly, recovery of punitive damages are proportional to the
defendant’s conduct and actual damages. To the extent that punitive damages
are awarded to injured plaintiffs, Pennsylvania has implemented numerous
procedural safeguards at various parts of the litigation process. These
procedures help to ensure that both the frequency and amount of punitive
damages is not excessive and that the defendant’s rights are adequately
protected. As such, any outright ban on punitive damages is unnecessary and
unjustly restricts a plaintiff’s ability to recover additional damages at the benefit
of the defendant. This approach also allows the defendant to escape paying for
the full extent of his or her misconduct. Thus, such policy only results in
defeating the very purpose of such damages: punishment and deterrence of the
defendant tortfeasor.
B. Pennsylvania Is Overlooking the Value of the Electoral Process as a Means
of Deterrence Due to Political Cost-Benefit Analysis.
Under Pennsylvania’s approach, punitive damages are intended to punish
the tortfeasor and deter similar conduct in the future.66 In the private arena,
these goals are accomplished by determining an amount of damages directly
proportional to the defendant’s wealth.67 On the other hand, it is generally
argued that when the defendant is the government, it cannot be adequately
punished because the government theoretically has unlimited wealth through its
taxation authority.68 In line with this idea of unlimited taxation power, critics
also claim that the government cannot be adequately deterred because
taxpayers, and not the tortfeasors, bear the costs of a punitive damages award.
However, this position ignores the fact that government officials respond to
political incentives. Punitive damages offer a form of a “negative incentive”
that could deter government employees and agents from acting in an egregious
or malicious manner that results in some form of injury to an innocent plaintiff.
As a comparison, a punitive damages award against a corporation is
considered to be a successful deterrent of future misconduct because generally
corporations are focused on profit-maximization and therefore, will take steps to
avoid unnecessary expenses and losses. From an economic standpoint, punitive
proper to have separate findings made by the jury when rendering the verdict.”).
66. See G.J.D. v. Johnson, 669 A.2d 378, 382 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (“An award of
punitive damages under Pennsylvania law serves a deterrence function as well as a
punishment function.”).
67. See Feld v. Merriam, 485 A.2d 742, 748 (Pa. 1984) (stating that while defendant’s
wealth is irrelevant to compensatory damages, it may be used to determining punitive
damages).
68. See Feingold v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 517 A.2d 1270, 1277 (Pa. 1986) (quoting
Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 267 (1981) (“Indeed, punitive damages
imposed on a municipality are in effect a windfall to a fully compensated plaintiff, and are
likely accompanied by an increase in taxes or reduction of public services for the citizens
footing the bill.”)); c.f. Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the
Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 408 (2000) (“Recognizing that
constitutional tort compensation ultimately comes from the pockets of taxpayers further
attenuates the connection between moral responsibility and the burden of rectification.”).
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damages are intended to provide an incentive for private individuals and profit
seeking companies to take appropriate steps to “invest in precautions” in order
to avoid paying large verdicts.69 While the government is not interested in
profits, the government does engage in a modified form of this cost-benefit
analysis.70 This analysis is focused on responding appropriately to the
preferences and complaints of its constituents because votes matter.71
The primary goal of an elected official72 is ultimately to win the next
election.73 To accomplish this objective, an official must act in a manner that
will result in the majority of voters choosing to elect him or her. Similarly, an
official must also avoid situations that can be used by the political opposition.
For example, in their capacity as governmental agents and employees, elected
officials must allocate the budget in order to maximize public benefits and to
avoid wasteful or unpopular spending.74 If a governmental agency or
employee’s willful and wanton conduct results in a punitive damage award, that
judgment and its corresponding litigation costs will be paid with tax money.
Because a public budget is unlikely to have a lump sum set aside for this award,
the government must raise that money by (1) diverting spending from publically
funded programs, (2) incurring debt, or (3) raising taxes.75
Overall, none of these options are likely to bestow any benefit on a current
government official, but each carries substantial risks. An elected official that
chooses to reallocate spending to pay for the litigation expenses and a punitive
69. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis,
111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 944 (1998) (discussing how judgment-proof contractors “will tend to
conduct their activities with less care than will actors with more at stake”).
70. See MICHAEL I. KRAUSS, PRINCIPLES OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY, 343-50 (2d ed.
2011) (discussing the “economics” of products liability law and how companies asses benefits
and risks of certain actions).
71. Levinson, supra note 68, at 370 (“So long as the social benefits of constitutional
violations exceed the compensable costs to the victim and are enjoyed by a majority of the
population, compensation will never deter a majoritarian government from violating
constitutional rights, because the majority of citizens will gain more from the benefits of
government activity than they lose from the taxes necessary to finance compensation
payments to victims.”).
72. While there are plenty of unelected governmental officials, the chain of command
above these unelected officials will lead directly to an elected official. As such, if a punitive
damages award is handed down, it will impact the elected officials due to their lack of
oversight, which will lead the elected official to implement punishments and restrictions down
the ladder to prevent further instances.
73. See generally Gary Biglaiser & Claudio Mezzetti, Politician’s Decision Making
with Re-election Concerns 66 J. PUB. ECON. 425 (1997) (analyzing factors politicians take
into account in order to “further their own political interests” and ensure re-election).
74. See Ross Ramsey, Promising to Redirect Budget Money Spent on Those Pet
Projects, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/12/us/promising-toredirect-budget-money-spent-on-those-pet-projects.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/D6F8ZTMN] (“All they have to do is figure out how to either cut the budget to fit or find $1.3
billion to pay for the state police and the Department of Motor Vehicles and other items
caught in the ‘pet projects’ net.”).
75. See Feingold v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 517 A.2d 1270, 1277 (Pa. 1986) (quoting
Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 267 (1981) (“Indeed, punitive damages
imposed on a municipality are in effect a windfall to a fully compensated plaintiff, and are
likely accompanied by an increase in taxes or reduction of public services for the citizens
footing the bill.”)).
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damage judgment against a government employee, does so at the peril of facing
severe political backlash from the opposing party in the next election.76 In
addition, incurring debt is also a popular topic in political election speeches and
television commercials because voters care about having to pay that money
back in the future. Furthermore, every politician knows that individuals do not
appreciate their own taxes being increased, regardless of the reason.77 And
while taxpayers may not like paying government salaries, they are likely to
dislike footing the bill, either now or in the future, for a governmental
employee’s intentional misconduct even more. Despite potential political
apathy, if a punitive damages judgment is entered against a governmental
agency or employee, it is likely to make media headlines, and such publicity can
be politically damaging.78
Ultimately this allocation of political risks is important due to the basic
notion that taxpayers who are upset with the government’s actions will hold

76. See, e.g., Karen Shuey, Fact Check: Corbett Defends his Education Spending
Record amid Criticism, LANCASTER ONLINE (Sep. 12, 2014), https://lancasteronline.com/
news/local/fact-check-corbett-defends-his-education-spending-record-amid-criticism/
article_55f511de-3a9f-11e4-aa2b-001a4bcf6878.html
[https://perma.cc/VD9A-EXAT]
(reviewing debate between Pennsylvania governor candidate’s regarding whether incumbent
cut took funding away from education); Jonathan Oosting, Fact Check: Did Michigan Gov.
Rick Snyder Cut $1 Billion From Education or Add $660 Per Student?, MLIVE.COM (Feb. 5,
2014, 8:07 AM), http://www.mlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/02/fact_check_did_michigan_
gov_ri.html [https://perma.cc/53Q6-KS93] (quoting candidate as saying his candidate “cut $1
billion from public schools . . . and taxed retirement funds all to create tax breaks for
corporations that aren’t creating jobs.”)(internal quotation marks omitted).
77. See TIMOTHY BESLEY & ANE CASE, INCUMBENT BEHAVIOR: VOTE S EEKING, TAX
SETTING AND YARDSTICK COMPETITION 26 (1992) https://www.princeton.edu/~accase/
downloads/Incumbent_Behavior.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZUA3-QSPY] (arguing that raising
taxes tends to hurt politicians’ reelection prospects); see also Ken Blackwell & Bob Morrison,
Broken Promises/Broken Presidencies, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 2013, 3:11 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ken-blackwell/broken-promisesbroken-pre_b_4181566.html
[https://perma.cc/P4HL-Q3RU] (quoting George H.W. Bush)(“Read my lips, no new taxes”));
Greenville County Voters Reject Penny Sale Tax Increase, (WYFF broadcast Nov. 5, 2014),
available at http://www.wyff4.com/news/greenville-county-voters-reject-penny-sales-taxincrease/29567182 [https://perma.cc/5CH4-D7MZ] (discussing how taxpayers rejected penny
increase in taxes during 2014 elections). Taxes are such an important issue to voters that a
pledge is currently making its way around Capitol Hill which asks political candidates to put
their promise to not raise taxes in writing. See About the Taxpayer Protection Pledge,
AMERICANSFORTAX REFORM.COM, http://www.atr.org/about-the-pledge [https://perma.cc/
QF4C-GKNC] (last visited Nov. 5, 2014) (promoting Taxpayer Protection Pledge).
78. See, e.g., Cari Herman, Dr. King Family’s Civil Trial Verdict: U.S. Government
(Jan.
16,
2012),
Assassinated
Martin,
WASHINGTONBLOG.COM
http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2012/01/dr-king-familys-civil-trial-verdict-us-governmentassassinated-martin.html [https://perma.cc/SHP6-7B9Q] (explaining case brought by Martin
Luther King’s family against U.S. government for wrongful death); John Monk, Sheriff Lott
Says $1.6 Million Lexington Jury Verdict Against His Department “Excessive,” Lacks
Evidence, THESTATE.COM (Aug. 25, 2014), http://www.thestate.com/2014/08/25/3639967/
sheriff-lott-says-16-million-lexington.html [https://perma.cc/L8YR-R99T] (discussing verdict
levied against police department and county for malicious prosecution and abuse of process);
Bob Sipchen, Whines, Cynicism Follow in Wake of LAPD Trial for Beating of Rodney King,
LA TIMES (June 25, 1992), http://articles.latimes.com/1992-06-25/news/vw-1326_1_rodneyking [https://perma.cc/43M7-BUB9] (reviewing media coverage of infamous trial regarding
police brutality against Rodney King).
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these individuals accountable through the voting process.79 Therefore, an
elected official who fails adequately supervise or negligently employs an
individual who ultimately engages in malicious and wonton conduct is likely to
face serious backlash from the voting populous. As a result, political costbenefit analysis facilitates direct, internal checks on the actions of the
government officials, employees, and agents. Specifically, government officials
would need to take proactive steps to ensure that all employees acted within the
bounds of the law and did not engage in reprehensible conduct. Put differently,
these officials would take all necessary steps to ensure that such conduct does
not happen again, thereby fulfilling one of the key rationales for punitive
damages: deterrence.80
C. Pennsylvania’s Approach Creates an Impermissible Exception for the
Government that Undermines the Basic Notions of the United States
Constitution
The federal and state courts’ analysis of the requisite state of mind
requirement for punitive damages varies based on the defendant and in doing so
contradicts current Pennsylvania precedent. As previously noted, punitive
damages may only be recovered when a plaintiff can demonstrate that the
defendant’s conduct is intentionally malicious and outrageous.81 In its analysis
of a tort claim, one Pennsylvania state court held that punitive damages may not
be imposed upon the government under a theory of vicarious liability.82 Shortly
thereafter, a federal court also shielded a local government from the vicarious
imposition of punitive damages in section 1983 cases.83 These decisions are
premised on the argument that because the government is not a living, breathing
being, it cannot form the requisite intent.84
79. Kevin Arceneaux, The Federal Face of Voting: Are Elected Officials Held
Accountable for the Functions Relevant to Their Office?, 27 POL. PSYCH. 731, 731 (2006)
(“By structuring the political system such that ‘[t]he federal and state governments are in fact
but different agents and trustees of the people, instituted with different powers’ . . . the
framers of the American constitution sought to strengthen accountability and preserve
freedom.”).
80. In a sense elected officials themselves are deterred; however, this argument is
premised more on the belief that punitive damages are intended to deter both the tortfeasor as
well as other individuals from engaging in or condoning intentional malicious conduct. See,
e.g., G.J.D. v. Johnson, 713 A.2d 1127, 1130 (Pa. 1998) (finding purpose of legislature
allowing recovery of punitive damages against tortfeasor’s estate was to deter others);
Sprague v. Walter, 656 A.2d 890, 922-23 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (“[P]unitive damages are
granted in such cases to punish the defamer’s ‘actual or apparent ill will’ and to deter others
from acting from ‘evil volition’ when engaging in similar conduct.”).
81. See Chambers v. Montgomery, 192 A.2d 355, 358 (Pa. 1963) (holding that punitive
damages may only be assessed when defendant actions are malicious, wanton, reckless,
willful, or oppressive). For further discussion of Pennsylvania’s state of mind requirement,
see supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
82. See Bensalem Twp. v. Press, 501 A.2d 331, 339 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985) (“[W]e
believe that assessment of such damages against a municipality under a theory of vicarious
liability is prohibited.”).
83. See Scott v. Twp. of Bristol, No. CIV.A. 90-1412, 1990 WL 178556, at *8 (E.D.
Pa. Nov. 14, 1990) (holding that government is not vicariously liable for punitive damages).
84. Means v. City of McKeesport, No. CIV.A. 11-1092, 2012 WL 6552835, at *9
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While this position, in and of itself, is logical, it directly contradicts
existing Pennsylvania precedent regarding assessing punitive damages against a
corporation, which, despite also not being a living, breathing being, has been
found to be able to form the requisite intent. In fact, since 1886, Pennsylvania
courts have continually held that an injured plaintiff may recover punitive
damages against a principal (including a business entity) for torts committed by
the principal’s agents acting within the scope of their employment.85 In
addition, this liability will exist even if the principal did not specifically order or
condone the agent’s actions.86 Despite this established history, Pennsylvania
courts created an exception for the government when the issue first came in
front of the court almost one hundred years later, in 1985.87 Even though the
courts were willing to engage in a legal fiction to find that a principal
corporation may form the requisite intent despite not being a person, the court
refused to adopt a similar approach when the defendant principal is a public
counterpart. Yet, no reason is offered to explain why the government is any
different from a corporation when it comes to forming the requisite state of
mind.
Generally, an essential method for ensuring accountability is by assessing
damages against the wrongdoer.88 The potential of having to pay such damages,
especially those tied to the egregiousness of one’s conduct and one’s wealth,
provides an incentive to act lawfully. Pennsylvania’s sovereign immunity
statutes already significantly diminish accountability because officials will
rarely have to answer for their actions in court. Similarly, the bar on punitive
damages means that even when the government’s conduct fits into one of the
fact-specific exceptions to sovereign immunity and a lawsuit is brought, the
government is exempt from having to pay additional damages as a result of that
egregious conduct.
Under Pennsylvania law, this immunity from punitive damages exists even
when the government’s action amounts to an egregious violation of tort or

(W.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 2012) (citing City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 26667 (U.S. 1981)) (“Because a municipality can have no malice independent of its officials,
punitive damages are not sensibly assessed against the government entity itself.”).
85. See Lake Shore & M.S.R. Co. v. Rosenzweig, 6 A. 545, 553 (Pa. 1886) (“The
corporation is liable for exemplary damages for the act of its servant, done within the scope of
his authority, under circumstances which would give such right to the plaintiff as against the
servant were the suit against him instead of the corporation.”); see also Delahanty v. First Pa.
Bank, N.A., 464 A.2d 1243, 1265 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (holding private entity vicariously
liable for punitive damages); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Genteel, 499 A.2d 637, 643 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1985) (explaining that imposition of vicarious liability for punitive damages based
on actions of agent is consistent with Pennsylvania precedent).
86. See Shiner v. Moriarty, 706 A.2d 1228, 1240 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (“In
Pennsylvania, there is no requirement that an agent commit a tortious act at the direction of
his principal, nor must the principal ratify the act, in order for punitive damages to be imposed
on him.”).
87. See generally Bensalem, 501 A.2d at 331 (describing court-created exception)
88. See generally James E. Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private
Bills: Indemnification and Government Accountability in the Early Republic, 58 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1862 (2010) (reviewing cases in which government officials were held liable for
damages and discussing how these decisions result in government accountability).
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constitutional law. As such, citizens have been stripped of an important weapon
to ensure that the government complies with either state or federal laws.
Furthermore, without the threat of having to pay, there is no incentive for
government officials to implement controls or supervise individuals so as to
prevent additional violations in the future.
This policy circumvents the basic purposes of punitive damage awards and
thereby increases the likelihood that similar misconduct, unchecked and
unpunished, will continue to occur. Punitive damage awards provide two
important functions consistent with obtaining both government accountability
through the punishment and deterrence objectives of punitive damages. First,
these awards are a means to ensure that upper level officials are providing
adequate oversight of lower level employees. Second, these verdicts are also
likely to result in weeding out those who abuse their positions or continually act
in a way that is harmful toward others.
It is not surprising that the legislature has promulgated rules in order to
protect itself and other aspects of the government. However, this decision is not
only short-sighted but is also a blatant disregard for the fact that government
officials are intended to be public servants who faithfully fulfill their duties to
the citizens, not untouchable figureheads who are beyond the purview of
internal or external accountability.
D. The Legislature’s Decision to Limit Indemnification for Intentional
Misconduct is Inconsistent and Illogical
As previously discussed, Pennsylvania’s current statutory scheme allows a
plaintiff to recover damages when a government’s agent or employee’s actions
amount to negligence. However, a plaintiff is completely barred from
recovering damages when that same individual intentionally and maliciously
injures the plaintiff. Generally, local municipalities may waive governmental
immunity so that an injured party may sue an employee of a local government
as an individual for damages when the employee’s actions or omissions were
the cause of the injuries.89 For example, the City of Philadelphia has adopted
such a waiver provision within their local code that enables suits against a
police officer when the officer’s conduct results bodily injury or death.90
According to one Pennsylvania statute, when a judgment is entered against
one of these government employees, that employee may seek indemnification
for costs associated with the judgment.91 Most notably, under the statute, an
89. See Borek v. Ramp, No. 3974., 1992 WL 1071393, at *179-80 (Pa. Com. Pl. Phila.
Cnty. May 22, 1992) (citing Borenstein v. City of Phila., 595 F. Supp. 853 (E.D. Pa. 1984))
(noting that while Pennsylvania Tort’s Claim Act extends immunity to local governments,
municipalities may waiver such immunity).
90. See Williams v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., No. 5235, 1989 WL 817137, at *452 (Pa.
Com. Pl. Phila. Cnty. July 12, 1989) (quoting § 21-701 of Philadelphia Code) (“(a) The City
shall not plead governmental immunity as a defense in any action commenced by any person
sustaining bodily injury or death caused by negligence or unlawful conduct of any person
sustaining bodily injury or death caused by negligence or unlawful conduct of any police
officer while the latter is acting within the scope of his office or employment.”).
91. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8548(a) (1980) (“[T]he local agency shall
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employee is entitled to recover such amounts regardless of the type of damages
assessed against the employee, including punitive damages.92 In order for an
employee to successfully obtain such indemnification, three conditions must be
met: “[1] the judgment is for damages to person or property, and he [2] has
given timely notice of the local agency, and . . . [3] the employee in good faith
reasonably believed that such act was, within the scope of his office or
duties . . . .”93 As such, this statute creates the possibility for an injured plaintiff
to indirectly recover damages from the government so long as the suit is
brought against an intermediary: a government employee. Moreover, under the
plain language of this statute, a plaintiff is not limited in what damages may be
recovered.
However, a secondary statute eliminates the state’s duty to indemnify an
employee if the employee actions constitute a “crime, actual fraud, actual
malice or willful misconduct.”94 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that
willful misconduct is the same as an intentional tort.95 Through this exception,
the Pennsylvania legislature not only defeated the plain language of another
statue, but also created a situation where the government itself is in a better
situation if their employees act with a wonton disregard for the very citizens
those employees are intended to protect. Thus, the Commonwealth is
essentially incentivized to not adequately supervise its employees or discourage
bad behavior because if a government takes such precautions then they are more
likely to be liable. Put differently, if a local police officer accidently injures an
individual, then, under the first statute above, the government would be required
to indemnify the officer after a judgment was entered against him. However, if
that officer intentionally inflicts serious bodily harm on the same individual, the
state is immune from a plaintiff’s suit for damages as well as the officer’s suit
for indemnification.
On their face, these outcomes are inconsistent with basic notions of what is
fair and just. Thus, they are likely to cause feelings of distrust and frustration
towards the government for instituting rules that not only favor the government
but also condone willful misconduct by the government. By allowing indirect
recovery against the government through the indemnification of employees,
Pennsylvania began to move toward a more equitable approach. However, by
limiting indemnification for willful conduct, the state has created an exception,
which defeats the plain language of another statute and that is just plain
senseless.
V.

WHERE PENNSYLVANIA SHOULD GO FROM HERE: AMENDING THE

indemnify the employee for the payment of any judgment on the suit.”) (emphasis added).
92. Wiehagen v. Borough of N. Braddock, 594 A.2d 303, 306 (1991) (“The case sub
judice is an indemnification action, which is not an action for damages under the Act, and
thus, is not subject to the damage limitations set forth in Section 8553.”).
93. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8548(a) (providing parameters for indemnification of
employee of local agency).
94. Id. § 8550.
95. Renk v. City of Pittsburgh, 641 A.2d 289, 293 (Pa. 1994) (“In other words, the
term ‘willful misconduct’ is synonymous with the term ‘intentional tort.’”).
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LAWS TO ALLOW FOR RECOVERY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Pennsylvania’s current statutes create an unnecessarily strict and
inequitable approach to punitive damage awards. The state’s sovereign
immunity statutes, in and of themselves, already provide the government with
an extreme amount of protection from civil liability generally. In order for
Pennsylvania to assure public confidence, it must allow for recovery of punitive
damages awards when the government’s actions are particularly egregious. To
the extent that there is continued concern about the allowance of such recovery,
the state may implement additional procedural safeguards so long as they do not
amount to excessive limitations.
A. Pennsylvania Is Adequately Protected by Sovereign Immunity and Does
Not Need to Limit Recovery of Damages
Pennsylvania’s legislature has already significantly limited the scope of the
government’s liability and therefore it is unnecessary to also ban a form of
recovery. The common law doctrine of sovereign immunity provides the
government with immunity from suit unless such immunity has been
specifically waived.96 The extent to which this immunity is waived to allow
injured plaintiffs a means of redress in court varies by jurisdiction.
While Pennsylvania’s legislature has taken a restrictive approach to
sovereign immunity, Pennsylvania courts have offered plaintiffs in certain
situations the possibility of relief by refusing to extend immunity under this
statute to include statutory causes of action.97 Nevertheless, a majority of claims
that may be brought against the government in other states are still protected by
sovereign immunity in Pennsylvania. Such robust immunity not only frustrates
but blatantly prevents the two intended purposes of civil litigation—
compensation for the injured party and deterrence of future wrongdoing—from
being accomplished.
Therefore, when such immunity can be overcome, the government should
allow all avenues to accomplish these objectives, including the availability of
punitive damages. As previously discussed, punitive damages may only be
recovered in a minute percent of cases generally. Given the statistical
likelihood the injured plaintiff will be able to overcome both sovereign
immunity and the burden of proof for punitive damages, an outright ban on the
recovery of punitive damages is unnecessary.

96. See 1 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2310 (1978) (reaffirming state has blanket sovereign
immunity unless waived). This immunity also applies to suits brought against states in federal
court under the Eleventh Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State.”)
97. See Meyer v. Cmty. Coll. of Beaver Cnty., 606 Pa. 539, 546 (2010) (“We hold that
governmental immunity does not extend to all statutory causes of action, regardless of
whether they sound in tort or contract.”).
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B. Pennsylvania’s Legislature Has Begun to Move the State in the Right
Direction
The Pennsylvania legislature created a statute that indirectly allows an
injured plaintiff to recover damages from local governments. However, that
recovery has been limited to exclude situations arising out of a defendant’s
malicious or willful conduct, or put differently, in instances where the plaintiff
would be able to overcome the burden of proof to establish a right to recover
punitive damages.
To avoid remaining inconsistent with its own precedent, Pennsylvania
should alter its sovereign immunity statutes to allow for recovery of punitive
damages when governmental agencies and employees act with complete
disregard for a person or their property. The purpose of a lawsuit and punitive
damages is to deter future misconduct; which Pennsylvania’s current waiver of
sovereign immunity fails to do. Instead, these statutes continue to protect the
state in the most egregious of instances, thereby perpetuating such wrongful
behavior.
The Pennsylvania Legislature should examine the potential political costs
and benefits that may result from allowing the recovery of punitive damages
from the government. After discerning the potential benefits that could result
from allowing the democratic purpose to work as intended, the legislature
should amend section 8528 of the Pennsylvania Code to allow for recovery of
punitive damages in instances when a plaintiff is able to overcome the stringent
standards of Pennsylvania’s sovereign immunity statute. Because that section is
formatted as a list, the legislature would simply need to add a number six to the
list as punitive damages.
In allowing this method of direct recovery, the state would not necessarily
need to abolish the statute prohibiting indemnification when an employee’s
actions amount to a “crime, actual fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct.”98
In fact, the preservation of this statute provides an additional incentive for
employees to refrain from acting in an egregious manner because those
employees can be sued as individuals and would have to pay any potential
judgment out of their own pocket.
Nevertheless, this statute alone is not enough to accomplish deterrence.
Specifically, individuals who may have indirectly contributed to the harm, such
as managers who may have been negligent in hiring and/or supervising the
tortfeasor, unless sued individually, would not be answerable for such conduct.
On the other hand, if punitive damages were awarded against the government
agency as a whole, all individuals involved, either directly or indirectly would
have to answer for their conduct. Therefore, it is mandatory that Pennsylvania
at the very least changes section 8528 of the Pennsylvania Code to allow for
recovery of punitive damages.

98. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8550.
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C. To the Extent Concerns Remain, Pennsylvania’s Legislature or Judiciary
May Also Implement Additional Procedural Safeguards
Pennsylvania’s legislature and judiciary have implemented numerous
procedural safeguards to protect massive and unwarranted punitive damages
awards. As previously discussed, these safeguards include a heightened burden
of proof, bifurcated verdicts, and limited discovery of the defendant’s wealth.
Pennsylvania could adopt even stricter approaches to these safeguards as well as
implement new restrictions. These procedural steps can be used to both limit a
plaintiff’s ability to recover damages as well as scaling back excessive awards
after they have been handed down.
For example, Pennsylvania’s legislature could limit the recovery of
punitive damages by increasing the evidentiary standard of proof. Pennsylvania
has increased the burden of proof for defamation cases to an “intermediate
level” of proof in which “clear and convincing evidence” must be presented.99
If it so chooses, the state legislature could institute this heightened burden of
proof to other torts equally. Alternatively, the state could go a step further and
require an even higher standard, such as the burden under criminal law, which
requires proof “beyond a reasonable doubt.”100 Arguably, this heightened
burden is logical because punitive damages fill in the “gaps” in the criminal law
by allowing “citizens [to] serve as prosecutors” or “private attorneys general.”101
If concerns regarding such awards remain, the legislature and judiciary
may add additional precautions to ensure that these statistics remain the status
quo. For example, in order to prevent juror bias, trial judges could limit what
arguments about punitive damages attorneys may raise during trial.
Alternatively, the judiciary may prohibit the mentioning of punitive damages at
trial until plaintiff’s attorney has established a prima facie case allowing such
recovery.
Overall, these protections ensure that punitive damages are rarely awarded
and highly correlated to the defendant’s conduct, as evinced by the various
empirical studies noted above. In the event of an uncharacteristic jury award,
additional procedural safeguards ensure that such awards can be scaled back
after the verdict has been announced. To maximize the effectiveness of these
safeguards, post-verdict review could occur at both the trial court level and the
appellate court review.

99. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-11-20(a) (1987); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(a) (West 1992);
GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(b) (West 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20(1) (West 1990);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.12 (West 1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 31.730(1) (2003); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 15-33-135 (1988); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-1-4.1 (1986); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 41.003(a) (West 2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-8-201(1)(a) (West 2011).
100. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-127 (West 1995) (“Exemplary
damages against the party against whom the claim is asserted shall only be awarded in a civil
action when the party asserting the claim proves beyond a reasonable doubt the commission of
a wrong.”).
101. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 27, at 1322 (justifying punitive damages).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The very premise of the United States’ tort system is to provide remedy
and redress. In situations like those presented in the introduction above, the
injured plaintiff may overcome Pennsylvania’s strict sovereign immunity statute
in order to recover some form of damages. On the other hand, the government
and its employees are neither adequately punished nor deterred for the
intentional actions that lead to those plaintiffs’ injuries. The basic purpose of
punitive damages is to prevent individuals from engaging in similar misconduct
again in the future. This goal can be accomplished regardless of who the
defendant is, but it cannot be achieved if punitive damages awards are
prohibited. Today, Pennsylvania’s legislature must propose and adopt new
legislation that would allow recovery of punitive damages in order to achieve
this goal. It would be wise to look to the statutes of Virginia and similarly
situated states for guidance in this process.
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